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Abstract 
Prospective payment systems fund hospitals based on a fixed-price regime that does not directly 
distinguish between specialist and general hospitals. We investigate whether current prospective 
payments in England compensate for differences in costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals 
and trauma and orthopaedics departments in general hospitals. We employ reference cost data for a 
sample of hospitals providing services in the trauma and orthopaedics specialty. Our regression 
results suggest that specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on average 13% lower profit margins. 
Under the assumption of break-even for the average trauma and orthopaedics department, two of 
the three specialist orthopaedic hospitals appear to make a loss on their activity. The same holds 
true for 33% of departments in our sample. Patient age and severity are the main drivers of such 
differences. 
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1. Introduction 
The prospective payment system (PPS) is commonly used to reimburse hospitals across 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Busse et al., 2006).  
It is built on a patient classification system that categorises patients into resource homogeneous 
groups, with each hospital receiving a fixed pre-determined tariff for every patient falling into a 
given group. This generates incentives for hospitals to contain costs. 
In its purest form, a PPS reimburses hospitals only on the basis of the volume and type of 
patients treated, without taking organisational characteristics into account. Under the German PPS, 
for example, tariffs do not depend on the hospLWDO¶VRZQHUVKLSVWDWXVRUPHPEHUVKLSWRWKHQDWLRQDO
insurance programme (Klein-Hitpaß and Scheller-Kreinsen, 2015). In contrast, other PPSs do 
consider organisational characteristics. In the French PPS, for instance, prices differ for public and 
private hospitals (Busse et al., 2011). In some countries, the PPS provides greater compensation to 
allow for the costs of specialist care. An example is the PPS of the Lombardy region in Italy, which 
applies a tariff top-XS WR DOO KRVSLWDOV ZLWK µKLJK VSHFLDOLVDWLRQ¶ XQLWV (Ettelt et al., 2006). In 
England, hospitals are paid extra if their patients receive specialised care (Daidone and Street, 
2013). 
Some health care systems feature hospitals that specialise on a single specialty, such as 
cardiology, ophthalmology, or orthopaedics.1  Specialisation is an organisational form which is 
supposed to generate the benefits of the µIRFXVHG IDFWRU\¶, i.e. greater efficiency, quality, and 
responsiveness (Herzlinger, 1996, Schneider et al., 2008, Skinner, 1974) but not necessarily lower 
costs. In the US, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission showed that the costs of specialist 
hospitals were no lower than the costs of general hospitals. While cardiac hospitals¶FRVWV were not 
significantly different from general hospitals¶, orthopaedic and surgical hospitals had 20 percent 
                                                 
1
 There are specialist hospitals in Europe (Ettelt et al., 2006, Medin et al., 2011), America (Carey et al., 2009, Araújo et 
al., 2014), Asia (Kim et al., 2013), India (Chanda, 2002), and Africa (Castro-Leal et al., 1999). 
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higher inpatient costs. Higher costs were due to more specialised and costly facilities, higher 
staffing levels, better quality of care, but also excess capacity and low inpatient volumes (MedPAC, 
2005, MedPAC, 2006). 
Such findings have stimulated empirical reVHDUFK RQ VSHFLDOLVW KRVSLWDOV¶ FRVWV Barro et al. 
(2006) study the impact of specialist cardiac hospitals on overall expenditure and quality in the US 
between 1996 and 1999. They find that entry of specialist hospitals reduces expenditure growth 
without affecting outcomes. Carey et al. (2008) investigate the cost efficiency of US specialist 
hospitals between 1998 and 2004. They find higher levels of inefficiency in orthopaedic and 
surgical hospitals compared to general hospitals. Kim et al. (2013) analyse South Korean specialty 
RUWKRSDHGLFKRVSLWDOVEHWZHHQDQG ZKLFKDUH IRXQG WR DSSO\ KLJKHUSDWLHQWV¶ FKDUJHV
than general hospitals. The authors suggest that such higher charges are due to greater set-up, 
investment, staffing and treatment costs. 
The present study contributes to this small empirical literature. We investigate the financial 
viability of specialist orthopaedic hospitals relative to trauma and orthopaedics (T&O) departments 
in general hospitals in the English National Health Service (NHS). Our primary objective is to test 
whether costs of specialist orthopaedic hospitals are higher than T&O departments in general 
hospitals even after accounting for differences in revenues. In other words, we test whether the 
current PPS covers the costs of specialist orthopaedic hospitals relative to T&O departments in 
general hospitals. 
In England, the majority of hospitals are funded through the national tariff payment system 
(NTPS).2 The NTPS is characterised by two key elements: the healthcare resource groups (HRGs), 
which classify patients into homogeneous categories based on diagnoses, procedures and some 
patients characteristics (Busse et al., 2011); and the tariffs, which vary by HRG and admission type 
                                                 
2
 More than 60% of hospital income comes from the NTPS. The remaining part is agreed in the NHS standard contract 
on the basis of actual activity (Department of Health, 2012c). 
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(elective or non-elective) and reflect the national cost for an HRG averaged across all hospitals 
(Department of Health, 2013b). An additional payment for excess bed days is made for patients 
whose length of stay is beyond a threshold, called the trim point, which also varies by HRG and 
admission type.3 Both the base and excess bed day tariffs are adjusted by the market forces factor 
(MFF) index to account for exogenous geographical differences in input prices (Department of 
Health, 2013a). Tariffs are inflated if the patient receives specialised services under specific HRGs 
(Daidone and Street, 2013).4 With such a payment system, specialist hospitals are likely to obtain 
higher revenues owing to the greater proportion of patients within an HRG who receive a 
specialised service. 
We collect data at HRG level from the NHS reference cost (RC) database for the financial year 
2013/14. Such data allow us to analyse the unit cost per patient of every inpatient HRG delivered 
through the T&O department of each hospital trust (hospital from now on) in the sample.5 Our 
econometric strategy employs four regressions. The first regression provides raw differences in unit 
costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments. In a second regression, we 
compare unit costs after controlling for differential payments (due to different HRGs and other tariff 
corrections). This is our key model and provides differences in profit margins between the two 
types of hospital: given that HRG tariffs are fixed, any differences in unit costs after controlling for 
differences in payment will be reflected in the profit margin. In the third regression, we explain any 
differences in profit margins (i.e. in costs after controlling for payment) as a function of possible 
determinants including patient characteristics such as proportion of males, age, socio-economic 
status, number of diagnoses and procedures, and hospital characteristics such as the salary of 
                                                 
3
 The trim point is the maximum expected length of stay for a patient falling under a specific HRG. It is defined by the 
Department of Health in order to identify unusually long lengths of stay and statistical outliers (Department of Health, 
2013a). 
4
 At the time of our study, top-ups were paid IRU&KLOGUHQ¶VRUWKRSDHGLFVSLQDO, and neurosciences specialised services. 
While all hospitals can obtain the top-up for specialised orthopaedic services, top-ups for the other specialised services 
are paid to a restricted number of eligible providers. 
5
 In the English NHS, a hospital trust or acute trust is an authority that provides secondary health care services through 
one or more acute hospitals. 
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doctors, hospital type, scale economies, quality, and geographical location. Our fourth regression 
examines the heterogeneity in profit margins across specialist hospitals. We estimate these models 
by weighted least squares (WLS), clustering standard errors within hospitals. 
The English NHS includes 141 general hospitals with a T&O department and three specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals. Although there are few specialist orthopaedic hospitals, they play an 
important role in the English NHS. They deliver high proportions of specialised services, 
commonly low-volume but high-cost treatments for patients with complex and rare conditions. 
Specialist orthopaedic hospitals therefore allow the achievement of a critical mass of clinical 
expertise to ensure patients receive specialised treatments that produces better health outcomes 
(NHS commissioning board, 2012). For instance, they provide 90% of bone and soft tissue 
sarcomas surgeries, and 50% of scoliosis treatments. They also perform high proportions of more 
common, corrective procedures, such as 50% of revision knee replacements and 20% of revision 
hip replacements (Briggs, 2012). We focus on specialist orthopaedic hospitals because T&O is the 
specialty with the fourth highest volume of patients, after general medicine, general surgery, and 
paediatrics. In 2013, 6.7% of all NHS patients were treated in a T&O department. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to study differences in profit 
margins between specialist hospitals and departments within general hospitals undertaking similar 
activities. Previous work focuses on either costs (e.g. MedPAC, 2006) or revenues (e.g. Kim et al., 
2013). Our analysis is at HRG level, rather than patient level, making use of cost data that all 
English hospitals are required to report annually to the Department of Health (DH). This is a natural 
choice since payment is also at HRG level and our focus is on controlling for differences in 
payment across hospital types. As cost data are available only at HRG-level in most countries, our 
methodological approach can easily be employed and replicated in future studies, either to compare 
specialist and general hospitals, or to make other types of comparison, such as between teaching 
and non-teaching hospitals. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the economic framework. Section 3 
describes the econometric strategy. Section 4 describes the data and shows descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses and concludes. 
2. Economic framework 
Under a PPS, hospitals are funded according to the number and type of patients treated. In the 
English payment system, the total revenue of hospital 1,...,k K  for providing HRG 1,...,j J  
amounts to: 
    1 1IN INjk jk jk jk jk jk jk jkE E kB jBR R R p te y p te q      , (1) 
where INjkR  is the total inlier revenue of hospital k for treating patients who have a normal length of 
stay for their HRG j; EBjkR  is the total excess bed day revenue of hospital k earned for each additional 
day that patients stay beyond their specific HRG j¶s trim point; INjkp  is the HRG inlier price received 
by hospital k for treating a patient falling under HRG j; EBjkp  is the per diem price received by 
hospital k for a single excess bed day produced under HRG j; t  is the tariff top-up on specialised 
orthopaedic services, which is a constant proportion across HRGs and hospitals; jke  is the 
proportion of patients in hospital k falling under HRG j receiving a specialised orthopaedic 
treatment; jky  is the number of patients admitted in hospital k under HRG j;6 and jkq  is the number 
of excess bed days produced in hospital k under HRG j. 
The HRG prices INjkp  and 
EB
jkp  can be written more explicitly as: 
  IN INjk j kp b mD  , (2) 
  jk jEB EB kp b mD  , (3) 
where INjD  is the inlier tariff for treating a patient falling under HRG j; EBjD  is the excess bed day 
                                                 
6
 The number of patients is expressed by the number of finished consultant episodes (FCEs). A FCE is a hospital 
episode for a patient under the care of an individual consultant. 
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tariff of each excess bed day under HRG j. These do not vary by hospital. In contrast, km  is a MFF 
index capturing exogenous geographical differences in the prices of hospital inputs (staff, land, and 
buildings) that vary GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH KRVSLWDO¶V ORFDWLRQ. Finally, b  is a fixed tariff adjustment 
common across hospitals, such as pay and price inflation or the national efficiency adjustment. 
The total cost of hospital k for providing HRG j is: 
 
IN EB IN EB
jk jk jk jk jk jk jkC C C c y c q    , (4) 
where INjkC  is the total inlier cost of hospital k for treating patients under HRG j (up to the trim 
point); EBjkC  is the total excess bed day cost of hospital k for the excess bed days produced under 
HRG j; INjkc  is the inlier unit cost of hospital k for HRG j, and EBjkc  is the per diem unit cost of 
hospital k for each excess bed day falling under HRG j. Since the national tariffs are set equal to the 
national average cost, we can write them more explicitly as: 
 
   and   
IN
jk jk jk jkIN k k
j j
jk jk
B
k
E
EB
k
c y c q
y q
D D  ¦ ¦¦ ¦ . (5) 
Therefore, the total profit function of hospital k for providing HRG j is: 
    1 1IN INjk jk jk jk jk jk jk jIN IN EB EB EB EBjk jk jk k jkjkR p te c y p te c qC R CS ª º ª º       ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ . (6) 
The profit margin, i.e. the profit per patient allocated to HRG j in hospital k, can be written as: 
    1 1jk jkIN IN EBjk jk jk jk jk jk jk
k
B
jk j
E qp te c p te c
y y
SS ª º      ¬ ¼ , (7) 
where  1IN INjk jk jkp te c   is the inlier profit margin of hospital k for HRG j, and  1EB EBjk jk jkp te c   
is the per diem profit margin of hospital k for each excess bed day produced under HRG j. As prices 
are fixed, this simply demonstrates that profitability will vary according to differences in costs that 
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are not accounted for in the payment arrangement.7 
Several factors driving hospital unit costs may also explain differences between specialist and 
general hospitals. Following Bradford et al. (2001), we summarise these in the following function: 
  ,jk jk kc c x z , (8) 
where jkx  is a vector of patient characteristics not captured by the HRG classification system; and 
kz  is a vector of hospital characteristics, such as input prices that are not captured fully by the 
market forces adjustment, teaching activity, or economies of scale. For instance, specialist hospitals 
are likely to employ surgeons with advanced expertise that are paid higher salaries, and to use more 
costly high tech equipment. A high level of specialisation is likely to produce high quality of care 
and, perhaps, higher costs. Specialist hospitals might attract higher volumes of patients, which may 
allow them to exploit economies of scale but could translate into larger proportions of complex 
patients requiring a more intensive use of resources. Below, in our empirical analysis, we are able to 
control for a number of such explanatory factors. 
3. Econometric specification 
We focus on four key specifications. The dependent variable is the log of the inlier unit cost (
IN
jkc ) or the per diem unit cost ( EBjkc ).8 All models are estimated by WLS in order to take into 
account, respectively, the number of patients ( jky ) or excess bed days ( jkq ) of every HRG within 
each hospital. Moreover, we cluster standard errors within hospitals in order to allow for any form 
of serial correlation of errors across HRGs. 
                                                 
7
 To illustrate this point, suppose that a specialist orthopaedic hospital s and a T&O department in general hospital g 
have the same volume of patients and excess bed days (ys=yg, qs=qg), the same location (ms=mg), and the same 
proportion of top-up tariffs (es=eg). Then, differences in profits will be equal to    IN INg s s g g s gEB EBc c y c cS S     . 
For instance, ʌgʌs>0 implies that the specialist orthopaedic hospital has lower profit margins than the T&O department 
in a general hospital. Such a difference will reflect factors not allowed for in the payment mechanism. 
8
 We take the logarithm to improve model fit, since unit costs are left-skewed. All estimated coefficients are therefore 
interpreted as semi-elasticities. 
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In the first regression, model I, we test whether unit costs are on average higher in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals before accounting for any differences in payments across hospitals: 
  ln jk k jkc sP E H   , (9) 
where jkc  is the inlier or per diem unit cost of HRG j in hospital k, ȝ is the intercept, ks  is a dummy 
equals one if hospital k is a specialist orthopaedic hospital, and jkH  is the error term. 
The estimated coefficient ÖE  translates into  Öexp 1E E   (Bamezai et al., 1999 p. 240, 
Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). This expresses the percentage difference in unit costs between 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals, i.e.  s g gc c cE    
with sc  and gc  EHLQJ UHVSHFWLYHO\ WKH VSHFLDOLVW RUWKRSDHGLF KRVSLWDOV DQG WKH 7	2 GHSDUWPHQWV¶
unit cost averaged across HRGs and hospitals. Suppose that 0E ! , which implies higher unit costs 
in specialist orthopaedic hospitals. This, however, does not necessarily imply that specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals have lower profit margins because no account is taken of hospital revenue. 
Specialist orthopaedic hospitals may provide more expensive treatments that are fully compensated 
by a higher HRG tariff. 
Our second and main econometric specification, model II, accounts for differences in payments 
across specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments: 
  ln jk k k jk j jkc s m eP E J G D H      , (10) 
where km  is the MFF index, jke  is the proportion of specialised services, and jD  indicates a set of 
HRG fixed effects which controls for differences in average cost for each HRG; in turn, this 
controls for the fixed prices at HRG level which are based on the average cost within each HRG. 
This specification compares unit costs across specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments, after differences in the MFF and specialist top-up payments are taken into account. 
The tariffs are subtracted through the HRG fixed effects, i.e. a dummy variable for each HRG j. The 
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estimated coefficient of every HRG dummy captures the average unit cost of the corresponding 
HRG category. Suppose again that 0E !  (computed using the estimated ÖE  in Model II). This 
result now implies that specialist orthopaedic hospitals exhibit lower profit margins compared with 
T&O departments. 
If we find that specialist orthopaedic hospitals are less financially viable, the finding could be 
due to a number of competing reasons which we account for in our model III. Following common 
practice (e.g. Gutacker et al., 2013, Street et al., 2010), this model controls for patient and hospital 
characteristics that may explain differences in unit costs in addition to differences in payments and, 
therefore, profitability: 
  ln jk k jk j jkk jk kc s m eP E J G D Hc      c TU zx , (11) 
where jkx  is a vector of patient characteristics measured at HRG level namely the proportion of 
males, average age, average socio-economic status, average number of diagnoses and procedures; 
and kz  is a vector of hospital characteristics such as doctor salaries, a dummy indicating whether 
the hospital is teaching hospital or a foundation trust, size dummies calculated using the number of 
T&O beds to capture potential economies of scale, the average patient outcomes for hip and knee 
replacement as measure of quality, and regional dummies to allow for residual geographical 
differences not captured by other adjustments. 
The estimated coefficient ÖE  in model II provides an average effect across specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals. There may be heterogeneity in terms of their financial position, with some exhibiting 
lower deficits and others higher surpluses. To explore such heterogeneity, as a sensitivity analysis, 
we estimate the following model IV which includes hospital fixed effects and directly standardises 
unit costs ( jkc ) by the MFF index ( km ): 
  ln jk k k jk j jkc m eP G D Hc    E h . (12) 
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In this specification, the specialist orthopaedic hospital dummy ( ks ) used in model I, II, or III is 
replaced with a vector of hospital dummies ( kh ). Also E  is now a vector including k coefficients, 
one for each hospital dummy: for instance, if Ö 0kE !  then the provision of trauma and orthopaedic 
services in hospital k implies lower profit margins relative to the average hospital. We directly 
standardise unit costs ( jkc ) because the MFF index ( km ) would be perfectly collinear with hospital 
dummies ( kh ) if added as an additional control variable. 
All regression models are estimated separately for inlier and per diem unit costs because the 
HRG price is computed separately for inlier and excess bed day activity. For each model, we obtain 
the inlier and per diem estimates of E , which are then used to compute an overall measure of cost 
(for model I) or profitability (for models II, III, and IV). For instance, consider our key model II in 
equation (10), which estimates the percentage difference in inlier or per diem profit margins 
between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments. The percentage difference in 
overall profit margin per patient treated between specialist orthopaedics hospitals and T&O 
departments, after allowing for differences in unit costs of excess bed days, can be written as: 
 
   IN INs g sEB EBgg s
I
g g
EN B
g
c c y c c q
C c y c q
S S      , (13) 
where g sS S  is the difference in profit averaged across HRGs and hospitals between T&O 
departments and specialist orthopaedic hospitals, expressed as a percentage of the T&O 
GHSDUWPHQWV¶ WRWDO FRVW DYHUDJHG DFURVV +5*V DQG KRVSLWDOV, gC  (to be consistent with the 
interpretation of profitability of the inlier activity, INE , and excess bed day activity, EBE ); 
IN IN IN IN
s g gc c cE   and EB EB EB EBs g gc c cE   are the difference in inlier and per diem unit costs 
averaged across HRGs and hospitals, respectively; y  and q are the average volume of patients and 
the average number of excess bed days, respectively.9 Standard errors of the overall estimates are 
                                                 
9
 The computation of the overall profitability for model IV in equation (12) differs from the computation described in 
equation (13). It becomes      > @  EB EBI N I EN N BIk k kC c c y c c q c y c qS S      , where kS  and kc  are the 
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bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. 
4. Data 
Our primary source of data is the RC database for the financial year 2013/14. For every 
admission type of every single inpatient HRG, each hospital annually reports information on inlier 
unit costs, per diem unit costs, number of patients, and excess bed days. 
Hospitals follow a standard process in calculating unit costs by applying the rules set out in the 
NHS costing manual, which establishes three basic principles (Department of Health, 2012a): first, 
costs capture the full cost of the services delivered, so that they can be reconciled back to the 
original aggregated costs in the accounts; second, costs are preferably allocated through direct 
imputation rather than through apportionment; and third, costs rigorously match the services 
generating them. The costing process consists of a top-down approach that, in the first instance, 
groups total costs into: costs that are directly attributable to patients (e.g. doctors, nurses, drugs); 
costs that are only indirectly linked to patients and that are identified on an activity basis (e.g. linen, 
catering); and overhead costs that are not related to patients (e.g. senior managers, administrative 
employees). Such costs are then attributed to macro-areas of treatment and support services (e.g. 
pharmacy, building maintenance), to hospital specialties (e.g. general surgery, orthopaedics), to 
wards, and finally to HRGs. Costs are further split by admission type such as non-elective (short or 
long), elective, and day case.10 Cost data are audited and must comply with validation rules to 
assure their accuracy, which is fundamental for the calculation of the national tariffs (Department of 
Health, 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
hospital k¶VWRWDOSURILWDQGXQLWFRVWUHVSHFWLYHO\DYHUDJHGDFURVV+5*VDQGKRVSLWDOV S  and c  are the total profit and 
unit cost respectively averaged across HRGs and hospitals, C  is the total cost averaged across HRGs and hospitals, 
 IN IN IN INkc c cE   and  EB EB EB EBkc c cE  . Also in this case, the standard errors of the overall estimates are 
bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions. 
10
 Unlike elective and day case patients, the admission of non-elective patients is unplanned. Day case and short non-
elective patients do not have an overnight stay in hospital, while elective and long non-elective patients have at least 
one overnight stay. 
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Our sample for the analysis of inlier unit costs consists of 79,096 observations across 1,284 
HRGs and 134 hospitals.11 Of these observations, 14,181 refer to day case treatment, 18,170 to 
elective care, 19,532 are short-stay non-elective care, and 27,186 are long-stay non-elective care. 
The sample for the analysis of per diem unit costs comprises 16,098 observations, of which 4,087 
are elective and 12,011 are non-elective. 
For every HRG in each hospital, we calculate the proportion of patients who receive specialised 
orthopaedic services, the proportion of male patients, average patient age, average socio-economic 
status, average number of diagnoses and procedures using data summarised from patient-level 
information in the HES (Bojke et al., 2015).12 We collect several variables measured at hospital 
level, most of which are from the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC; since 
renamed NHS Digital): a dummy variable for specialist orthopaedic hospitals, teaching hospitals, 
and foundation trusts; the average salary of doctors employed in the T&O specialty;13 and regional 
dummies. The HSCIC also provides Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) including, for 
each hospital, the average health change of patients undergoing hip and knee replacement (Appleby 
and Devlin, 2004, Gomes et al., 2015). PROMs measure the SDWLHQWV¶ quality of life through the 
EQ-5D health-status questionnaire before and six months after their surgery. Hence, the health 
change is the difference between the post and pre-surgery EQ-5D scores, and it is estimated through 
a risk-adjustment methodology that takes account of patient characteristics and factors beyond 
KRVSLWDOV¶ FRQWURO (Department of Health, 2012b). 14  Using data from the NHS statistics, we 
                                                 
11
 Ten T&O departments in general hospitals did not report data on PROMs for hip or knee replacement and they are,  
therefore, dropped from the sample. 
12
 We count specialised services following the rules defined in the Prescribed Specialised Services, and not the criteria 
specified in the Specialised Services National Definition Sets. We use the overall Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
as a measure of socio-economic status. This index is constructed through the combination of seven IMD domains such 
as income, employment, health deprivation and disability, education, skills and training, barriers to housing and 
services, crime, and living environment. A value of one indicates extreme deprivation while 32,482 indicates no 
deprivation. 
13
 The salary of a doctor employed in the T&O specialty is estimated through a s-shape function of age, minimum and 
maximum salary. Further details are provided in section A.1 of the appendix. 
14
 More precisely, the risk-adjustment methodology comprises three steps. The first step consists of estimating a 
Generalised Least Square fixed effects model in which the dependent variable is the post-surgery EQ-5D score of each 
patient, the covariates are pre-surgery EQ-5D score, patient characteristics (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity), economic 
13 
 
construct dummies related to the size of the T&O department (small, medium, large, and very 
large), which are defined on the quartiles of the T&O beds distribution of all hospitals. Finally, the 
RC database reports the MFF index. 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 illustrates that the distribution of inlier and per diem unit costs substantially departs 
from normality when in natural units, while it is approximately normal after taking the log. Table 1 
contains descriptive statistics of the variables measured at HRG level for the sample with 
observations of all admission types.15 Our sample includes the three specialist orthopaedic hospitals 
and 131 T&O departments in general hospitals. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on average 
higher inlier unit costs than T&O departments (£5,196 vs £2,987) and a higher number of patients 
per HRG (20 vs 12). The proportion of patients receiving specialised services is higher in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals (1.1%) than T&O departments (0.1%). 49% of patients are male in both 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments, while patients in specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals are on average eight years younger (47 vs 55) and better-off (deprivation index greater by 
2%). Specialist orthopaedic hospitals record about the same number of diagnoses (5) for their 
average patient but provide one more procedure (4 vs 3) than T&O departments. 
The lower part of Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics for excess bed days. Per diem unit 
costs are on average higher in specialist orthopaedic hospitals (£465) than in T&O departments 
(£301). There are on average 22 excess bed days per HRG, but many more in the specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals (45) than in T&O departments (22). The proportion of patients receiving 
specialised services with a per diem unit cost is also higher in specialist orthopaedic hospitals (2.7% 
                                                                                                                                                                  
deprivation, comorbidity, procedure and post-operative length of stay. This regression also controls for unobserved 
hospital heterogeneity through fixed effects. In the second step, the model is used to estimate predictions. The third step 
aggregates such predictions to obtain the adjusted average post-surgery EQ-5D score for each provider, from which the 
national average pre-surgery EQ-5D score is subtracted for the calculation of the adjusted average health gain. 
15
 Table A1 and Table A2 in section A.2 of the appendix show descriptive statistics of the variables measured at HRG 
level for the sample with day case and elective observations, and short non-elective and long-non elective observations, 
respectively. 
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vs 0.1%). Similarly, the proportion of male patients with a long length of stay in specialist hospitals 
is slightly greater than in T&O departments (47.5% vs 46.8%). Long-stay patients are nine years 
younger (49 vs 58), better-off (deprivation index greater by 3%), and have the same number of 
diagnoses (5) but one more procedure (4 vs 3) in specialist orthopaedic hospitals compared to T&O 
departments. 
Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics of the variables measured at hospital level. 24 (17.9%) 
trusts are teaching hospitals, and 80 (59.7%) hospitals have foundation status. Two of the specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals are foundation trusts but none is a teaching hospital. 15 hospitals are in the 
London region, one of which is specialised. The remaining two specialist orthopaedic hospitals are 
located in the West Midlands region, which includes 14 other general hospitals. The regions with 
the largest and smallest number of hospitals are, respectively, the North West including 22 
hospitals, and the East Midlands and the North East with 8 hospitals. On the basis of the quartile 
division, a T&O department is categorised as small if it has less than 46 specialty beds, medium if 
between 46 and 61 beds, large if between 62 and 79 beds, and very large if it has more than 79 beds. 
The three specialist orthopaedic hospitals fall into the very large group. The MFF index is on 
average greater in specialist orthopaedic hospitals compared to T&O departments (1.085 vs 1.075). 
A doctor working in T&O earns on average approximately £86,000. Doctors in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals are paid 5.6% more, on average, than doctors in T&O departments. 
Of all NHS patients treated in the T&O specialty, 9.5% receive a hip replacement and 6.7% 
undergo a knee replacement. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have a higher average health gain for 
hip (0.442 vs 0.425) and knee (0.317 vs 0.315) replacement. 
5. Results 
Table 3 provides the estimation results of models I, II and III for inlier and per diem unit costs 
when all admission types are included in the sample. Recall that unit costs are in logs. The specialist 
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orthopaedic hospital GXPP\¶V HVWLPDWHG FRHIILFLHQW is positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level in model I and II but it is insignificant in model III for the inlier unit costs. It is always 
negative but statistically insignificant in the regressions for the per diem unit costs. Specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals have therefore statistically 
different costs for the inlier activity but statistically similar costs for the excess bed day activity. 
The first column of Table 3 shows the estimates of model I in equation (9), indicating raw 
differences in unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments. Specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals have on average (exp(0.149)í1=)16 16.1% higher inlier unit costs. In contrast, 
they have on average 14.4% lower per diem unit costs but this result is not statistically significant. 
Model II in equation (10) provides estimates of differences in unit costs after accounting for 
differences in revenue by subtracting tariffs (HRG fixed effects) and by accounting for tariff 
adjustments (MFF and specialised services top-ups). 7KHVSHFLDOLVWRUWKRSDHGLFKRVSLWDOGXPP\¶V
estimated coefficient therefore can be interpreted as the difference in profit margins between 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments.17 Specialist orthopaedic hospitals have on 
average 20.3% lower inlier profit margins. A percentage point increase in the proportion of 
specialised services raises inlier unit costs by 1.2%. A standard deviation increase in the MFF 
(0.064) is associated with an increase in inlier unit costs of 5.6%. 
With model III in equation (11), we investigate whether differences in profit margins can be 
explained by patient and hospital characteristics. The differences in inlier and per diem unit costs (
ÖE ) are both statistically insignificant, as are the variables capturing hospital characteristics. Instead, 
patient characteristics measuring age and number of diagnoses and procedures are significant at 1% 
                                                 
16
 The exponential transformation is applied to all the figures reported in the text in this section. This explains the 
differences with the coefficients reported in Table 3. 
17
 Recall that the unit cost is the dependent variable in model II (III or IV) while tariffs are on the right-hand-side of the 
equation. Under such a regression design, ȕ reflects the difference between unit costs and tariffs instead of the definition 
of profit margins, i.e. difference between tariffs and unit costs. To abide by the correct definition of profit margins, the 
interpretation of ȕ must be reversed so that, for example, a positive estimate indicates lower profit margins in specialist 
orthopaedic hospitals relative to T&O departments in general hospitals. 
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level in explaining the differences in inlier (but not per diem) profit margins between specialist 
orthopaedic hospital and T&O departments.18 Age and inlier unit costs have a quadratic relationship 
so that unit costs decrease up to 75 years (-0.015/(2×0.0001)) and increase above that. At the 
sample mean of 54.7 years, one more year decreases inlier unit costs by 0.4% 
(-0.015+2×0.0001×54.7). An additional diagnosis or procedure raises inlier unit costs by 3.8% or 
2.4%, respectively. We extend model III by adding interactions between all control variables. We 
find that differences in both inlier and per diem profit margins between specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals and T&O departments remain statistically insignificant (see Table A5 in section A.3 of the 
appendix).19 
So far, we have presented our findings on specialist orthopaedic hospitals for inlier and excess 
bed day hospital activity, separately. Table 4 reports the overall percentage change in unit costs ( E ) 
between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments for each admission type. 20 The 
overall percentage change is calculated as the sum of inlier and per diem percentage changes in unit 
costs or profit margins. The first column shows the percentage changes derived from model I. The 
overall unit costs are not statistically different between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O 
departments. In model II, when hospital revenues are taken into account, specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals have on average 13% lower overall profit margins than T&O departments at 1% of 
statistical significance (see footnote 17 for details on the interpretation). Model III shows that the 
                                                 
18
 To reinforce this finding, we provide the results of a stepwise regression in Table A3 in section A.3 of the appendix. 
These results show that age, number of diagnoses and procedures together drive the differences in inlier unit costs 
between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general hospitals, with there being a seeming 
difference between the hospital types if any of these patient characteristics is omitted. Table A4 shows that differences 
between hospital types in per diem unit costs are always statistically insignificant whether or not patient characteristics 
are accounted for. 
19
 As a further robustness check, we estimate model V which is akin to model III but also includes hospital random 
effects. Unlike the hospital fixed-effects model, the hospital random-effects model can be estimated when the specialist 
orthopaedic hospital dummy is included although this requires the additional assumption that the covariates are 
uncorrelated with the HRG-invariant unobserved hospital heterogeneity. Table A6 in section A.3 of the appendix shows 
that the results for model V are very similar to those for model III. 
20
 Recall that the percentage change ( E ) is obtained through the exponential transformation of the estimated coefficient 
( ÖE ). 
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overall profit margins in specialist orthopaedic hospitals are no longer significantly different from 
those in T&O departments after controlling for some key determinants including patient 
characteristics such as proportion of males, age, socio-economic status, number of diagnoses and 
procedures, and hospital characteristics such as salary of doctors, hospital type, specialty size, 
quality, and other regional differences. 
5.1. Sensitivity analysis 
As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate the same three models for each admission type. The lower 
panel of Table 4 (second column) shows that statistically significant lower overall profit margins in 
specialist orthopaedic hospitals are found for elective (22.6%) and long non-elective activity 
(38.9%), but not for short non-elective and day case activity. 
Finally, estimation of model IV including hospital fixed effects in equation (12) suggests wide 
variation in overall (inlier) profit margins across hospitals in our sample, from 37.5% (38.6%) 
below the average to 38% (40.6%) above the average. Figure 2 indicates that 45 hospitals, i.e. about 
a third, have significantly lower overall profit margins compared to the average profit margins, and 
42 have significantly higher overall profit margins. 21  None of the three specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals have overall or inlier profit margins significantly above the average. In particular, as 
shown in Table 5, the overall profit margins of the Robert Jones and Agnes Hunt orthopaedic 
hospital (minus 19.9%) and the Royal orthopaedic hospital (minus 35.2%) are significantly below 
the average.22 The Royal National orthopaedic hospital has instead average overall profit margins. 
The latter finding is driven by higher profit margins on day case activity (40.6%). 
                                                 
21
 We count only hospitals for which confidence intervals do not overlap the dashed horizontal line at zero, i.e. hospitals 
for which the deviation of profit margins from the mean is statistically different from zero. 
22
 Recall that ȕk in model IV captures the deviation of hospital k¶V SURILW PDUJLQV from the mean profit margins: a 
positive ȕk means that hospital k¶VSURILWPDUJLQVDUHORZHUWKDQWKHPHDQZKLOHDQHJDWLYH ȕk suggests that hospital k¶V
profit margins are higher than the mean (see also footnote 17 for details on the interpretation). For ease of interpretation, 
we multiply the estimate of ȕk by minus one and, therefore, the negative sign now indicates profit margins that are lower 
than the mean. All coefficients in Table 5 indicate the percentage change ( kE ) obtained through the exponential 
transformation of ÖkE . 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
The English NTPS is used to reimburse hospitals according to the amount and mix of activity 
that they undertake. Like most PPSs, there is a recognition that HRGs imperfectly account for all 
patient or exogenous hospital characteristics that might influence costs (Busse, 2012, Monteith, 
2013). As such, payment adjustments include top-ups to the tariff if patients received particular 
specialised care and payment corrections allow for differential costs of labour and capital across the 
country. These refinements help ensure a fair reimbursement system that rewards hospitals 
according to the care that they provide, not the advantageous circumstances in which they might 
operate 'DLGRQHDQG6WUHHW*UDãLþHWDO. 
Given these payment adjustments, hospitals that provide care at a cost below tariff should be 
more profitable. Arguably specialist hospitals should be in a strong position to benefit financially 
from these arrangements. By focussing on a limited set of services they should be able to better 
exploit informational or organisational advantages associated with specialisation. Such advantages 
derive from concentrating on a specific, defined caseload that enhances learning-by-doing and 
attracts staff with particular expertise and more easily allows efficient practice in care delivery to be 
identified and operationalised (Schneider et al., 2008). 
If these advantages obtain we would expect specialist hospitals to earn higher profits than 
general hospitals that undertake similar activities. The evidence provided in this study does not 
support this claim.  We have analysed the costs and revenues associated with delivery of trauma and 
orthopaedic services in all three specialist orthopaedic hospitals and 131 T&O departments in 
general hospitals in England. We find that, compared to the national average, profit margins are 
13% lower in the three specialist orthopaedic hospitals. Profits are statistically significantly lower 
across all patients that have at least one overnight stay, either elective or non-elective. 
These lower profits are not due simply to patients in specialist hospitals requiring long lengths 
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of stay or specialist care. Payment arrangements allow for this possibility through excess bed day 
payments and tariff top-ups for specialised treatments, and we account for these revenue 
adjustments in our analysis. Nor does it appear that differences can be explained by the 
characteristics of the hospitals such as their teaching and foundation status or geographical location, 
nor by WKH QXPEHU RI WKH 7	2 SDWLHQWV WUHDWHG QRU E\ YDULDWLRQ LQ GRFWRUV¶ VDODULHV, nor by the 
quality of care as captured by PROMs for two high-volume orthopaedic procedures such as hip and 
knee replacement. Lower profits are observed even after these potential explanatory factors are 
taken into account. 
Instead, we find that lower profit margins in specialist orthopaedic hospitals are explained by 
patient characteristics such as age and severity as captured by the number of diagnoses and 
procedures. This means that, although hospital payments are based on a detailed patient 
classification system (HRG) and on adjustments for the higher cost of specialised care, providers 
that generally attract more complex patients such as specialist orthopaedic hospitals may be 
financially disadvantaged. That said, being part of a general hospital does not guarantee better 
financial performance with 33% of the T&O departments also making a loss. 
Our study has three main limitations. First, our sample includes only three specialist orthopaedic 
hospitals. Such a small number of specialist orthopaedic hospital trusts, however, is not the result of 
sample selection but reflects the reality that there are only three specialist orthopaedic hospital trusts 
in the English NHS. Specialist hospitals are few and far between in many countries. Hence, we 
believe that our analysis is appropriate and generally applicable. Moreover, although we are limited 
by the actual number of hospitals, we analyse hundreds of HRGs for each specialist hospital and we 
investigate heterogeneity across the three hospitals in model IV using hospital fixed effects. This 
model shows that two of the three specialist hospitals make a loss and none of them makes a profit, 
which confirms that specialist orthopaedic hospitals are in a relatively weak financial position. 
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Second, our estimated tariffs may not be identical to current tariffs, i.e. the actual tariffs that 
hospitals receive in 2013/14. We compute tariffs by including in our models (II, III, or IV) the HRG 
fixed effects, which capture the unit cost of each HRG averaged across hospitals. This reflects the 
methodology used to compute current tariffs but, in practice, current tariffs are based on cost data 
lagged by three years in order to ensure data accuracy and stakeholder engagement in their 
calculation (Department of Health, 2013a). To account for the time lag, the current tariffs¶ 
methodology adjusts for inflation and efficiency trends. We therefore argue that tariffs estimated 
through our methods are a reasonable approximation to current tariffs. 
Finally, PROMs are currently available only for two orthopaedic procedures such as hip and 
knee replacements. These procedures are however the most common in T&O departments: of all 
NHS patients treated in the T&O specialty, 9.5% receive a hip replacement and 6.7% undergo a 
knee replacement. We therefore argue that hip and knee replacements are indicative of departmental 
performance. 
Future research may be required before a definitive recommendation about whether profit 
margins differ in trauma and orthopaedic services across general and specialised hospitals. But we 
have set out a methodology that can be applied to other types of hospital service and in other 
settings, to investigate the extent to which differences in costs between groups of hospitals are 
adequately covered by prospective payment systems. 
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Tables and Figures  
Table 1 ± Descriptive statistics of variables measured at HRG level. 
  Variable at HRG level 
All hospitals 
  
Specialist hospitals 
  
General hospitals 
  
Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
In
lie
r 
Inlier unit cost 3,031 3,484 22 129,419 
  
5,196 8,555 173 129,419 
  
2,987 3,287 22 78,447 
Number of patients (FCEs) 12.2 37.4 1 1,622   20.3 57.7 1 644   12.1 36.9 1 1,622 
Number of specialised services 0.05 0.73 0 55   0.66 4.23 0 55   0.04 0.42 0 26 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.7 0.0 100.0   1.1 6.1 0.0 69.2   0.1 1.5 0.0 100.0 
Proportion of males (%) 49.1 19.6 0.0 100.0   49.2 24.3 0.0 100.0   49.1 19.5 0.0 100.0 
Age 54.7 18.9 0.0 97.0   47.4 17.4 1.0 90.0   54.8 18.9 0.0 97.0 
Deprivation index 15,969  4,889  12  32,474    16,296  4,365  194  32,417    15,963  4,899  12  32,474  
Number of diagnoses 4.969 2.655 1 20   4.733 2.511 1 13   4.974 2.657 1 20 
Number of procedures 3.079 2.108 0 24   4.118 2.158 0 12   3.058 2.102 0 24 
Number of HRGs 1,284 
  
415 
  
1,272 
Observations 79,069   1,564   77,505 
Ex
ce
ss
 
be
d 
da
y 
Per diem unit cost 305 474 20 54,422 
  
465 2,867 65 54,422 
  
301 188 20 9,499 
Number of excess bed days 22.2 35.5 1 715   44.8 81.8 1 715   21.7 33.4 1 538 
Number of specialised services 0.11 1.31 0 55   1.95 7.56 0 55   0.07 0.56 0 26 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 2.0 0.0 69.2   2.7 9.6 0.0 69.2   0.1 1.3 0.0 45.6 
Proportion of males (%) 46.8 16.2 0.0 100.0   47.5 18.1 0.0 100.0   46.8 16.2 0.0 100.0 
Age 57.8 15.7 0.1 97.0   49.2 16.2 7.9 90.0   58.0 15.6 0.1 97.0 
Deprivation index 16,047  4,564  201  32,268    16,499  3,636  1,428  31,664    16,036  4,583  201  32,268  
Number of diagnoses 5.096 2.535 1 20   4.906 2.501 2 13   5.100 2.536 1 20 
Number of procedures 3.160 2.096 0 24   4.378 2.265 0 12   3.131 2.084 0 24 
Number of HRGs 675   183   662 
Observations 16,098   373   15,725 
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Table 2 ± Descriptive statistics of variables measured at hospital trust level. 
Variable at hospital trust level 
All hospitals 
  
Specialist hospitals 
  
General hospitals 
Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.022 0.148 0 1   1.000 0.000 1 1   0.000 0.000 0 0 
Market forces factor 1.076 0.064 1.003 1.298   1.085 0.082 1.032 1.180   1.075 0.063 1.003 1.298 
Salary of doctors (£10,000) 8.664 0.744 6.596 10.060   9.134 0.293 8.797 9.324   8.653 0.749 6.596 10.060 
Teaching hospital 0.179 0.385 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.183 0.388 0 1 
Foundation hospital 0.597 0.492 0 1   0.667 0.577 0 1   0.595 0.493 0 1 
Small department 0.201 0.403 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.206 0.406 0 1 
Medium department 0.284 0.452 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.290 0.456 0 1 
Large department 0.254 0.437 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.260 0.440 0 1 
Very large department 0.261 0.441 0 1   1.000 0.000 1 1   0.244 0.431 0 1 
Average health change after hip replacement 0.425 0.028 0.311 0.476   0.442 0.033 0.410 0.476   0.425 0.028 0.311 0.474 
Average health change after knee replacement 0.315 0.028 0.215 0.396   0.317 0.025 0.288 0.332   0.315 0.028 0.215 0.396 
London 0.112 0.316 0 1   0.333 0.577 0 1   0.107 0.310 0 1 
East Midlands 0.060 0.238 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.061 0.240 0 1 
East of England 0.127 0.334 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.130 0.337 0 1 
North East 0.060 0.238 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.061 0.240 0 1 
North West 0.164 0.372 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.168 0.375 0 1 
South East 0.149 0.358 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.153 0.361 0 1 
South West 0.112 0.316 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.115 0.320 0 1 
West Midlands 0.119 0.325 0 1   0.667 0.577 0 1   0.107 0.310 0 1 
Yorkshire and The Humber 0.097 0.297 0 1   0.000 0.000 0 0   0.099 0.300 0 1 
Number of trusts 134   3   131 
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Table 3 ± Estimation results when all admission types are included. 
Regressor 
Inlier   Per diem 
Model I Model II Model III   Model I Model II Model III 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 
0.149** 0.185** 0.149   -0.156 -0.276 -0.140 
(0.059) (0.076) (0.097)   (0.187) (0.196) (0.204) 
Market forces factor 
  0.845*** 0.928**     0.353 0.485 
  (0.213) (0.460)     (0.381) (1.228) 
Proportion of specialised services 
  0.012** 0.010*     0.003 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.006)     (0.003) (0.003) 
Proportion of males 
    -0.00009       -0.0004 
    (0.000)       (0.001) 
Age 
    -0.015***       -0.006 
    (0.004)       (0.006) 
Age (squared)     0.0001***       0.0001* 
    (0.000)       (0.000) 
Deprivation index 
    -0.000003       -0.000007 
    (0.000)       (0.000) 
Number of diagnoses 
    0.037***       -0.031* 
    (0.010)       (0.018) 
Number of procedures 
    0.024***       -0.017 
    (0.007)       (0.012) 
Salary of doctors 
    0.003       -0.041 
    (0.021)       (0.040) 
Teaching trust 
    0.057*       0.097 
    (0.034)       (0.076) 
Foundation trust 
    -0.049*       0.011 
    (0.026)       (0.059) 
Medium department 
    -0.019       -0.068 
    (0.035)       (0.081) 
Large department 
    -0.021       0.002 
    (0.032)       (0.083) 
Very large department 
    0.022       -0.117 
    (0.034)       (0.077) 
Average health change after hip replacement 
    0.952*       -1.896* 
    (0.523)       (1.081) 
Average health change after knee replacement 
    -0.414       0.468 
    (0.465)       (1.177) 
Constant 
    6.625***       6.429*** 
    (0.608)       (1.607) 
HRG fixed effects NO YES YES 
  
NO YES YES 
  
Regional fixed effects NO NO YES 
  
NO NO YES 
  
Observations 79,069 79,069 79,069   16,098 16,098 16,098 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.797 0.805   0.005 0.074 0.157 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 4 ± Differences in unit costs between specialist orthopaedic hospitals and T&O departments in general 
hospitals. 
Inpatient activity Model I Model II Model III 
A
ll 
ad
m
iss
io
n
 ty
pe
s Overall1 
0.114 0.135*** 0.116 
(0.157) (0.000) (0.466) 
Inlier 
0.161** 0.203** 0.161 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.125) 
Per diem 
-0.144 -0.241 -0.131 
(0.408) (0.161) (0.494) 
El
ec
tiv
e 
Overall1 
0.254*** 0.226*** 0.204** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) 
Inlier 
0.311*** 0.282*** 0.249*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Per diem 
-0.225 -0.248 -0.176 
(0.195) (0.175) (0.243) 
Lo
ng
 n
on
-
el
ec
tiv
e Overall1 
0.601*** 0.389*** 0.403* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.076) 
Inlier 
0.741* 0.499*** 0.486*** 
(0.064) (0.004) (0.003) 
Per diem 
-0.140 -0.192 -0.033 
(0.395) (0.196) (0.864) 
Short non-elective 
0.293 0.320 0.369* 
(0.101) (0.147) (0.099) 
Day case 
-0.071 0.029 -0.018 
(0.731) (0.887) (0.924) 
1
 Standard errors are bootstrapped using 1,000 replications. 
p-value in parentheses; *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table 5 ± Specialist RUWKRSDHGLFKRVSLWDOV¶overall profit margins. 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital All admission types Day case Elective 
Short non-
elective 
Long non-
elective 
Royal National Orthopaedic Hospital NHS 
Trust 0.0% 40.6%* -30.5%* -79.4* -80.5%* 
Robert Jones And Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust -19.9%* -21.5%* -18.0%* 4.2% -4.8% 
Royal Orthopaedic Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust -35.2%* -29.5%* -29.0%* -69.0%* -30.6%* 
* significantly different from the average hospital at 5% 
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Figure 1 ± Distribution of inlier and per diem unit costs in natural units and logs. 
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Figure 2 ± Distribution of overall and inlier profit margins. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Estimation of the salary of doctors 
We assume that the salary of doctors follows a s-shape function depending on age, minimum 
and maximum salary. This means that salary rises with increasing returns in the first half of the 
working life, and it goes up with decreasing returns during the second half. In symbols, we estimate 
the salary as follows: 
  min max, ,nk nk agew f W w w A   (A1) 
where nkw  is the salary of doctor n ( 1,..., N ) in hospital k, nkf  is the full time equivalent ratio,23 
W  is the s-shape salary function, minw  and maxw  are the minimum and maximum salaries associated 
WR WKHGRFWRU¶VJUDGHDQG ageA  LVDFRHIILFLHQWYDU\LQJGHSHQGLQJRQ WKHGRFWRU¶VDJH7KHVDODU\
function W  can be represented as follows: 
  
min
max min
min
min max
max min
max
max
                    if     30
     if     30 50
, ,
     if     50 70
                    if     70
age
age
age
w age
w w
w age
A
W w w A
w w
w age
A
w age
­ ° °  d °° ® °  d °°° t¯
 (A2) 
where, 
 
20     if     30 34   or   65 69
10     if     35 39   or   60 64
5.5    if     40 44   or   55 59
3.2    if       or   55 5 45 5 94
age
age age
age age
A
a
ag
ge age
age e
d d d d­° d d d d° ® d d d d
d d d
°° d¯
 (A3) 
In Figure A1, we illustrate the salary function  W   for consultant and associate specialist doctors. 
Figure A1 ± Estimated salary function for consultants and associate specialists 
                                                 
23
 The full time equivalent ratio is the proportion of the total number of paid hours during a period over the number of 
working hours in that period. 
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The average salary of doctors in hospital k ( kw ) is therefore calculated as follows:  
 
nkn
k
k
w
w
N
 ¦ . (A4) 
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A.2 Descriptive statistics by admission type 
Table A1 ± Descriptive statistics for day case and elective activity. 
  Variable at HRG level 
All hospitals 
  
Specialist 
hospitals   General hospitals 
  
Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Day case 
  
Inlier unit cost 1,408 876 
  
1,492 973 
  
1,406 872 
  
Number of patients (FCEs) 26 67 
  
33 77 
  
25 66 
  
Number of specialised services 0.07 0.75 
  
0.43 3.10 
  
0.06 0.52 
  
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 1.8 
  
0.6 4.2 
  
0.2 1.6 
  
Proportion of males (%) 49.8 19.5 
  
48.6 22.5 
  
49.8 19.4 
  
Age 49.6 17.2 
  
44.2 17.3 
  
49.8 17.1 
  
Deprivation index 16,039 4,769 
  
16,140 3,868 
  
16,036 4,795 
  
Number of diagnoses 3.718 1.704 
  
3.983 1.926 
  
3.709 1.695 
  
Number of procedures 3.449 1.630 
  
4.041 1.729 
  
3.430 1.623 
  
Number of HRGs 509   239   490 
  
Observations 14,181   441   13,740 
Elective 
In
lie
r 
Inlier unit cost 3,680 3,620 
  
5,978 8,808 
  
3,586 3,200 
Number of patients (FCEs) 16 42 
  
23 58 
  
15 41 
Number of specialised services 0.07 0.94 
  
0.61 4.06 
  
0.05 0.47 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.2 2.3 
  
1.2 6.3 
  
0.2 1.9 
Proportion of males (%) 48.9 19.5 
  
49.4 26.3 
  
48.9 19.2 
Age 54.6 16.9 
  
47.6 17.9 
  
54.8 16.8 
Deprivation index 16,080 4,807 
  
16,368 4,648 
  
16,068 4,813 
Number of diagnoses 4.644 2.369 
  
4.908 2.640 
  
4.633 2.357 
Number of procedures 3.516 1.901 
  
4.195 2.288 
  
3.488 1.879 
Number of HRGs 730   350   696 
Observations 18,179   716   17,463 
Ex
ce
ss
 
be
d 
da
y 
Per diem unit cost 358 897 
  
563 3,450 
  
344 245 
Number of excess bed days 19 34 
  
49 92 
  
17 25 
Number of specialised services 0.24 1.91 
  
1.65 6.66 
  
0.14 0.88 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.4 2.9 
  
2.5 9.0 
  
0.3 1.8 
Proportion of males (%) 46.7 14.4 
  
46.6 18.1 
  
46.7 14.1 
Age 56.2 13.3 
  
48.9 16.3 
  
56.7 12.9 
Deprivation index 16,235 4,350 
  
16,557 3,762 
  
16,213 4,386 
Number of diagnoses 4.343 2.076 
  
4.807 2.494 
  
4.312 2.041 
Number of procedures 3.656 1.838 
  
4.416 2.263 
  
3.605 1.795 
Number of HRGs 313   151   282 
Observations 4,087   257   3,830 
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Table A2 ± Descriptive statistics for short non-elective and long non-elective activity. 
  Variable at HRG level 
All hospitals 
  
Specialist 
hospitals   General hospitals 
  
Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
Short non-elective 
  
Inlier unit cost 1,253 1,381 
  
2,154 3,412 
  
1,248 1,358 
  
Number of patients (FCEs) 6 12 
  
2 1 
  
6 12 
  
Number of specialised services 0.03 0.39 
  
0.20 1.93 
  
0.03 0.36 
  
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 0.9 
  
0.4 3.8 
  
0.1 0.8 
  
Proportion of males (%) 49.5 18.6 
  
50.0 21.9 
  
49.5 18.6 
  
Age 52.7 20.8 
  
47.8 16.8 
  
52.7 20.8 
  
Deprivation index 15,908 4,843 
  
15,869 4,634 
  
15,908 4,845 
  
Number of diagnoses 4.840 2.562 
  
4.490 2.196 
  
4.842 2.564 
  
Number of procedures 2.466 1.907 
  
3.656 2.115 
  
2.459 1.903 
  
Number of HRGs 839   97   836 
  
Observations 19,523   119   19,404 
Long non-elective 
In
lie
r 
Inlier unit cost 4,720 4,241 
  
10,181 12,150 
  
4,661 4,035 
Number of patients (FCEs) 8 17 
  
3 3 
  
8 18 
Number of specialised services 0.04 0.76 
  
1.31 6.28 
  
0.03 0.37 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.7 
  
1.9 8.4 
  
0.1 1.4 
Proportion of males (%) 48.6 20.5 
  
49.4 22.6 
  
48.5 20.4 
Age 58.9 18.7 
  
51.4 15.7 
  
59.0 18.7 
Deprivation index 15,902 5,035 
  
16,529 4,240 
  
15,895 5,043 
Number of diagnoses 5.933 2.947 
  
5.547 2.770 
  
5.937 2.949 
Number of procedures 3.035 2.458 
  
4.235 2.403 
  
3.022 2.456 
Number of HRGs 1,022   175   1,020 
Observations 27,186   288   26,898 
Ex
ce
ss
 
be
d 
da
y 
Per diem unit cost 286 162 
  
247 148 
  
287 162 
Number of excess bed days 23 36 
  
35 53 
  
23 36 
Number of specialised services 0.07 1.02 
  
2.61 9.25 
  
0.04 0.40 
Proportion of specialised services (%) 0.1 1.6 
  
3.2 10.8 
  
0.1 1.1 
Proportion of males (%) 46.9 16.8 
  
49.6 18.1 
  
46.8 16.8 
Age 58.4 16.4 
  
49.8 15.9 
  
58.5 16.4 
Deprivation index 15,983 4,633 
  
16,370 3,353 
  
15,979 4,643 
Number of diagnoses 5.352 2.625 
  
5.126 2.512 
  
5.354 2.626 
Number of procedures 2.992 2.151 
  
4.296 2.276 
  
2.979 2.146 
Number of HRGs 647   86   643 
Observations 12,011   116   11,895 
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A.3 Additional sensitivity analysis 
Table A3 ± Stepwise regression analysis in model III for inlier unit costs. 
Regressor 
Inlier 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Specialist orthopaedic 
hospital 
0.147 0.199** 0.200** 0.178** 0.181** 0.159* 0.165* 0.170* 
(0.099) (0.085) (0.085) (0.089) (0.083) (0.095) (0.086) (0.091) 
Market forces factor 
0.810* 0.947** 0.945** 0.875** 1.043** 0.927** 1.027** 1.036** 
(0.450) (0.441) (0.441) (0.435) (0.469) (0.459) (0.468) (0.463) 
Proportion of 
specialised services 
0.010* 0.011** 0.011** 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Proportion of males 
0.00005   0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00004 -0.0002 0.0004 
(0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 
-0.015***     -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014***   
(0.004)     (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   
Age (squared) 0.00008**     0.00007* 0.00008* 0.00009** 0.0001**   (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Deprivation index 
-0.000003       -0.000004 -0.000003 -0.000004 -0.000004 
(0.000)       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of diagnoses 
0.041***         0.042***   0.033*** 
(0.011)         (0.010)   (0.010) 
Number of procedures 
0.028***           0.032*** 0.027*** 
(0.007)           (0.008) (0.007) 
Salary of doctors 
  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0006 0.003 -0.0007 0.003 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
Teaching trust 
  0.081** 0.081** 0.070** 0.066* 0.058* 0.063* 0.066* 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Foundation trust 
  -0.063** -0.063** -0.060** -0.058** -0.050* -0.055** -0.052** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Medium department 
  -0.007 -0.007 -0.013 -0.021 -0.017 -0.022 -0.015 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) 
Large department 
  -0.013 -0.013 -0.018 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.018 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Very large department 
  0.026 0.026 0.022 0.02 0.023 0.019 0.024 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Average health change 
after hip replacement 
  0.825 0.825 0.847 0.89 0.952* 0.900* 0.936* 
  (0.554) (0.553) (0.546) (0.546) (0.524) (0.540) (0.531) 
Average health change 
after knee replacement 
  -0.519 -0.515 -0.485 -0.373 -0.453 -0.332 -0.402 
  (0.474) (0.474) (0.477) (0.476) (0.467) (0.473) (0.466) 
Constant 
7.100*** 6.372*** 6.356*** 6.913*** 6.697*** 6.681*** 6.618*** 5.979*** 
(0.553) (0.589) (0.592) (0.589) (0.607) (0.603) (0.611) (0.612) 
HRG fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A4 ± Stepwise regression analysis in model III for per diem unit costs. 
Regressor 
Per diem 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Specialist orthopaedic 
hospital 
-0.131 -0.107 -0.131 -0.123 -0.102 -0.101 -0.096 -0.112 
(0.304) (0.295) (0.304) (0.306) (0.278) (0.282) (0.278) (0.278) 
Market forces factor 
0.490 0.910 0.497 0.529 1.239 1.246 1.234 1.133 
(1.274) (1.144) (1.271) (1.244) (1.357) (1.334) (1.356) (1.371) 
Proportion of 
specialised services 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion of males 
  -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 
  -0.011   -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010   
  (0.013)   (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)   
Age (squared)   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Deprivation index 
  -0.000010     -0.00002* -0.00002* -0.00002* -0.00002 
  (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of diagnoses 
  0.006       -0.002   0.002 
  (0.029)       (0.029)   (0.029) 
Number of procedures 
  -0.022         -0.012 -0.018 
  (0.021)         (0.021) (0.020) 
Salary of doctors 
-0.068   -0.068 -0.068 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 
(0.049)   (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Teaching trust 
0.014   0.015 0.020 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.001 
(0.087)   (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) 
Foundation trust 
0.045   0.045 0.045 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.050 
(0.071)   (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) 
Medium department 
-0.065   -0.064 -0.061 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095 -0.098 
(0.088)   (0.088) (0.089) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
Large department 
0.069   0.07 0.073 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.052 
(0.094)   (0.094) (0.097) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) 
Very large department 
-0.036   -0.036 -0.032 -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 -0.048 
(0.092)   (0.092) (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.092) 
Average health change 
after hip replacement 
-0.225   -0.222 -0.228 -0.031 -0.036 -0.028 -0.020 
(1.275)   (1.274) (1.276) (1.282) (1.283) (1.280) (1.283) 
Average health change 
after knee replacement 
0.936   0.924 0.895 1.392 1.397 1.375 1.382 
(1.211)   (1.215) (1.222) (1.255) (1.267) (1.255) (1.275) 
Constant 
5.539*** 4.979*** 5.568*** 5.732*** 4.810*** 4.810*** 4.863*** 4.854** 
(1.744) (1.350) (1.752) (1.647) (1.753) (1.754) (1.759) (1.922) 
HRG fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level and are reported in parentheses 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A5 ± Analysis of interactions between covariates in model III. 
Regressor Inlier     Per diem 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 0.083     -0.146 
(1) Market forces factor -6.022     -1.440 
(2) Proportion of specialised services -0.198*     -0.054 
(3) Proportion of males -0.005     -0.012 
(4) Age 0.044     -0.004 
(5) Age (squared) -0.001***     0.000 
(6) Deprivation index 0.000     0.000 
(7) Number of diagnoses 0.116     0.064 
(8) Number of procedures -0.123     0.022 
(9) Salary of doctors -0.614     -1.054 
(10) Teaching trust -1.071     -1.821 
(11) Foundation trust -0.712     -2.798*** 
(12) Medium department 0.100     4.843*** 
(13) Large department 1.150     2.900 
(14) Very large department 1.099     4.579** 
(15) Average health change after hip repl. 0.656     13.009 
(16) Average health change after knee repl. -0.082     -27.838 
Interactions 
(1) x (2) 0.150**   (4) x (10) 0.010** 
(3) x (2) 0.0002**   (6) x (2) 0.000002*** 
(3) x (9) -0.001**   (6) x (13) -0.00002** 
(5) x (11) 0.0001**   (6) x (14) -0.00005*** 
(5) x (4) 0.00001***   (6) x (15) 0.001*** 
(7) x (2) -0.003**   (7) x (2) 0.002** 
(7) x (3) -0.0004**   (7) x (5) -0.00004** 
(8) x (11) 0.026**   (8) x (11) 0.029*** 
(8) x (4) -0.003***   (11) x (9) -0.167** 
(8) x (5) 0.00003***   (12) x (1) -3.635*** 
(13) x (11) -0.184***   (13) x (11) 0.398*** 
(14) x (2) 0.028***   (14) x (1) -3.815*** 
(15) x (2) -0.18**   (15) x (12) -5.829** 
(15) x (11) 2.199**   (16) x (9) 3.314*** 
(15) x (12) -2.634**   (16) x (11) 8.573*** 
(15) x (14) 3.088**   (16) x (12) 5.422** 
(16) x (14) -3.108**       
Constant   13.516**     12.454 
HRG fixed effects   YES     YES 
Regional fixed effects   YES     YES 
Adjusted R-squared   0.814     0.307 
Interactions not significant at 1% or 5% level are not reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital trust level. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
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Table A6 ± Results for model V that includes hospital random effects. 
Regressor Inlier Per diem 
Specialist orthopaedic hospital 
0.122 -0.201 
(0.342) (0.288) 
Market forces factor 
0.428 0.049 
(0.651) (1.488) 
Proportion of specialised services 
0.014* 0.002 
(0.008) (0.003) 
Proportion of males 
-0.0006 -0.0003 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Age 
-0.018*** -0.006 
(0.004) (0.006) 
Age (squared) 0.0001*** 0.00008 (0.000) (0.000) 
Deprivation index 
-0.000001 -0.000003 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Number of diagnoses 
0.040*** -0.016 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Number of procedures 
0.013 -0.015* 
(0.009) (0.008) 
Salary of doctors 
0.008 -0.044 
(0.030) (0.048) 
Teaching trust 
0.076 0.108 
(0.051) (0.086) 
Foundation trust 
-0.052 0.03 
(0.037) (0.071) 
Medium department 
0.006 -0.063 
(0.051) (0.090) 
Large department 
-0.015 0.041 
(0.047) (0.098) 
Very large department 
0.008 -0.121 
(0.049) (0.088) 
Average health change after hip replacement 
1.345* -2.202 
(0.768) (1.361) 
Average health change after knee replacement 
-0.137 0.003 
(0.691) (1.389) 
Constant 
-0.050*** -0.024 
(0.018) (0.031) 
Hospital random effects YES YES 
HRG fixed effects YES YES 
Regional fixed effects YES YES 
Maximum likelihood estimation. For ease of computation, we control for the 
HRG fixed effects using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell transformation. 
Clustered standard errors are bootstrapped with 1,000 repetitions and are 
reported in parentheses. 
*** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 
 
